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Jewish refugees arriving at Nachod

Far left: Gaynor Jacobson on Polish/Czech border

According to Jacobson, the Czechs had established an efficient machinery to handle the flow of Jewish refugees. The Czech government established a committee comprised of the Welfare and Labor Ministry, the Foreign Affairs Ministry and the Interior Ministry. This committee worked in conjunction with the Czech JDC office and local Czech Jewish community representatives. Together they handled all the problems that arose, keeping the Jewish refugees flowing smoothly through Czechoslovakia^[1].

Crises were as constant as the sun and the moon. The number of refugees was increasing rapidly and so were the expenses. According to Jacobson, from January 5^th 1946 to the beginning of July 1946 the Czech government spent 21 million Czech korunas (crowns) ($420,000) on food alone.^[2] And the Jewish exodus from Eastern Europe had just begun. Then the Czech trains began to roll. Trains were the only way to efficiently and quickly deal with the mass of people crossing the country.

According to William Leibner who crossed the border illegally, the trek went something like this: Jews arrived at the Polish border in small groups, many by truck, and some on Polish trains that stopped at the last railway station on the Polish side. The refugees went to a pre–arranged meeting point where the Brichah guides were waiting to take them across the borders in small groups. Most of the Jewish refugees crossed the border on foot while a few managed to cross aboard trucks.

Once the refugees reached the Czechoslovakian side, the small groups gathered at one of a few staging areas, either at the large camps the Czech government set up at Nachod or Broumow, or other smaller camps. The small Jewish refugee groups were then combined into larger groups and put on trains bound for Austria and Germany. Rarely did the groups spend more than a day at the camps, although sometimes two or three days were needed to organize the transports.

Once the Czech trains reached the Austrian or German border, the refugees disembarked, the Brichah again divided the refugees up into smaller groups that surreptitiously found their way across the Austrian or German borders. The Brichah then transported the refugees on trucks borrowed from UNRRA, the JDC, or the American Army.^[3] The Czechs had been assured that UNRRA would assume most of the costs of transportation, temporary lodging and food for the transient Jewish refugees. In preliminary discussions with the local UNRRA chief in Czechoslovakia, Mr. Elfam Rhees, regarding these expenses, Rhees intimated that UNRRA would assume the costs, or a good portion of them.

But there was obvious discrimination. The Czechs were shocked when they learned that UNRRA refused to pay bills concerning transport of these Jewish refugees.

The UNRRA office readily paid transportation bills and other expenses for the transport of non–Jews while payment for the transport of Jews dragged on. UNRRA officials easily determined which was which. Almost all the passengers on transports originating at the Polish borders heading toward Austria or Germany were Jewish refugees. The non–payment of the bills increased the expenses of the Czech government. The British and American campaign indirectly exploited this state of affairs through their press connections.

The Czech Deputy Interior Minister, Zdenek Toman, who was in charge of the borders, insisted that the transports of illegal Jews continue even as more bills were presented to UNRRA. But as trains of Jewish refugees rolled across Czechoslovakia, the costs continued to climb, with no reimbursements forthcoming. The fact UNRRA received the bills did not mean all the bills were paid. UNRRA decided which bills to pay and the Czech government frequently received less than they spent.

Toman later said, in an interview to Tad Szulc, “Had a non–Jew occupied my post, he would have definitely stopped the trains and other expenses until payment was made^[4].

“The fact that transportation costs and other expenses soared did not seem to bother Toman. As he said, as long as he was in power, Czechoslovakia would continue to physically provide transportation for the Jewish refugees.^[5]

Some Czech newspapers began to discuss the fact that UNRRA was not paying for the refugees and the expenses were being shouldered by the Czech government that could ill afford them. The topic was even discussed on the radio. These discussions received a tremendous boost when Mary Gibbons, Deputy Assistant Director of UNRRA Operations for Europe arrived in Prague. On July 7, 1946, three days after the Kielce pogrom that left 42 Jewish survivors dead, she publicly stated that UNRRA would not pay for Jewish Polish refugees who crossed Czechoslovakia since they had already been repatriated to their homes following the war.^[6] She continued to repeat this statement throughout Czechoslovakia until July 14, 1946 when she left the country.

According to the JDC's Gaynor Jacobson, Mrs. Gibbons repeated the same statements over and over, from July 7 to July 14, 1946, in every meeting she had with Czech ministers, high officials and the press.^[7]

The publicized statements by Mary Gibbons of UNRRA had one objective, notably to force Czechoslovakia to close the borders and not permit Jewish refugees to transit the countries. Britain had to stop the illegal ships with Jewish refugees that were embarrassing England throughout the world, especially in the USA. The pictures showing British soldiers manhandling Holocaust survivors undermined world public opinion in Britain's ability to control and rule Palestine.

Gibbons was not concerned with UNRRA but rather with British foreign policy. We already mentioned General Morgan's statements pertaining to Jewish Holocaust survivors. The statements created a storm of protests in the USA. Jewish organizations were outraged by these veiled anti–Semitic statements dressed up in humanitarian clothing. Congressmen and senators received mail expressing indignation at these statements. UNRRA offices began to explain that the statements were reported incorrectly or they were misquoted out of context. The Czech press and many government officials only saw that Czechoslovakia would have to pay large amounts of money which it did not have. Czech cabinet ministers began to discuss the situation.

UNRRA had not paid for the repatriation of the Polish citizens who had been in Russia during the war. Their repatriation was covered by the Russian–Polish repatriation agreements. The fact that the Jews decided to leave their so–called new homes out of self–protection did not faze Gibbons. Gibbon's political motives were clear. Britain wanted Czechoslovakian borders closed so that Jewish refugees could not sail to Palestine. Still, the mass exodus of European Jews was in full swing, and the Czechs continued the transient program, the bills increased daily, and the expenses mounted like stacks of hay during a harvest.

The Czech press and radio carried the news of Gibbons' statement. Hearing that the Czech government was not to be reimbursed, many Czech officials panicked. The situation was exacerbated by the British and American embassies in Prague. There, embassy officials did their best to incite fear in the public's mind: the idea that the Czechs would be stuck paying all the bills for the Jewish refugees, bills the government could ill–afford.

The theme espoused by the British and American embassies and Gibbons was seized upon by the local press. The country was just starting to find some traction after years of Nazi occupation. The Czech economy was struggling, the government nearly bankrupt, and unemployment was high. Clearly, the Czech people were opposed to the use of the little money they had going to help Jewish refugees. Most believed the country could ill afford these expenses.

The fears, rumors and harsh criticisms soon reached the ears of government ministers. The government met on July 16, 1946, and a heated discussion ensued regarding the Polish Jewish refugees crossing

Czech government offering help to the Joint in Prague

Meanwhile, the borders stayed open and the flow of refugees increased hourly. To facilitate the flow of Polish Jewish refugees, the JDC received permission to extend the reception facilities at the transit camps. The European Joint organization sent massive supplies of food, clothing and medical supplies to the border camps to provide the Polish Jewish transients with their basic needs. The Czech government placed many facilities at the disposal of the Joint organization, and permitted the expansion of existing facilities namely Nahod, which could handle up to 1,000 people.

The Joint and the Brichah worked hand in hand to move this mass of people across Czechoslovakia. The operation threatened to collapse on a few occasions but it continued to roll until most of the Jews that wanted to, had left Eastern Europe.

The Joint offices in Czechoslovakia and Poland were placed on a military footing to cope with the impending mass movements. The Brichah mobilized all its forces to deal with the transports. Jews crossed the Polish–Czech borders prior to this agreement but the numbers were relatively small. In May of 1946 3,052 Polish Jews crossed illegally to Czechoslovakia, in June 8,000, in July 19,000, in August 35,346, and in September 1946, 12,379 Jews crossed the border illegally^[10]. During five months 77,777 Polish Jews crossed the Czech–Polish border at a single place called Nachod. The camp was set up on the Czech side. Of course, there were other crossing points in Czechoslovakia namely Brumov, where another temporary refugee camp was established. Both camps provided the refugees with a resting place, some food and medical attention if needed prior to moving to the next place. There were a few other smaller camps along the Czech border.

Letter sent by Jacobson to the Joint Office in New York requesting that the office publicize the activities of Czechoslovakia on behalf of the Jewish refugees

‘All night long. Every night little groups of Jewish refugees stream across the Polish border into the little town known as Nachod in Czechoslovakia. Sometimes their clothes are wet up to their waist, their eyes are red and bloated from the strain of trying to see through the darkness. Their backs are bent.’ The same author writes: ‘The Czech–Polish border was reopened last night after being closed for three days. Additional trains have been placed on the Nachod–Bratislava run to speed movements of the Jewish refugees. Earlier, the Prague radio had said that the frontier had been closed following British intervention. But the frontiers were always reopened following heavy pressures on the involved parties be it in Washington or Prague. Some Polish Jews were shipped by rail to Bratislava and then Austria, while others were sent directly to the American zone of Germany.’

Zdenek Toman was familiar with most of the Joint and Brichah activities in Czechoslovakia since he had agents everywhere that reported to him. He of course knew that the Brichah had a transmitter, since his office permitted the item to be brought from Belgium and installed in Prague. He was even aware of the bribes that were paid along the road and borders by the Brichah officials as they travelled to and from Czechoslovakia. His office kept an eye on all these activities. Toman, Jacobson and Goberman worked together to solve the various problems that occurred along the road. Toman constantly urged Jacobson to publish the activities of the Czech government on behalf of the Polish Jewish refugees in the American press to create a cordial atmosphere for Czechoslovakia in the US. The Joint established or supported

Czech prime minister thanks Jacobson for the help extended to the flood victims

But the issue of the transit program for Polish Jewish refugees stayed hot. The Czech cabinet continued their discussions; more meetings were held between various ministers, party officials, even with Czech social service organizations, UNRRA and JDC officials. Meetings were held in the cabinet, conferences were held between the involved Ministers of Interior, Welfare, and Foreign Affairs, and Joint and UNRRA officials. Toman of course kept Jacobson informed of the dealings behind the scenes. At a dinner meeting, Toman informed Jacobson that unless the Joint took drastic action, the Czech government would be forced to close the borders.^[12] The implication was clear that even he, Toman, would have to bow to the will of the cabinet and close the borders. Toman further pointed out to Jacobson that the Soviets were taking an interest in the transit of Jews in Czechoslovakia. We already mentioned the letter of Zorin to Gottwald. Now, Peter I. Alexeev, head of UNRRA's Russian mission in Prague, actually chief resident of the Soviet NKVD in Czechoslovakia was dead set against helping Polish Jewish refugees cross into and through Czechoslovakia.^[13]

While the Soviet Union granted more flexibility to the Czech government than to any other country under its hegemony, Alexeev and his staff in Prague did everything in their power to undermine the Czech government's stand on Jewish refugees. Alexeev, under orders from Moscow, did his best to sabotage UNRRA's efforts helping Jewish refugees in Czechoslovakia.^[14]

Moscow knew when and how to apply pressure. Alexeev told his bosses, and the Czechs, “There are small numbers of Polish refugees in Czechoslovakia and the government can handle the problem.”^[15] The implication was clear: the present number of Polish refugees could be handled but if the number of refugees continued to increase, the Czechs would have problems with the Soviets.

These Soviet hints altered the mood of the Czech cabinet. The cabinet was heading towards closing the transit program according to Toman unless the Joint organization acted^[16]. Toman advised Jacobson to take whatever drastic action he could to influence the cabinet to keep the borders open. Both Toman and Jacobson knew that if the borders were closed the Jewish Holocaust survivors would be stuck in Eastern Europe and would be at the mercy of the rising anti–Semitism. Worse, Jacobson knew that if the borders were closed the flood of refugees making their way to Palestine would stop cold.

Jacobson immediately contacted the JDC's European head Joseph Schwartz who was at the time in Hungary. They set up a meeting in Vienna.^[17] Also invited to the meeting was Pinkas Lubianer (later Pinhas Lavon) then the Jewish Agency representative in Prague, later important politician in Israel. In Vienna the three men discussed the situation. Jacobson and Lubianer traveled to Austria together by train. While on a flight from Hungary to France, Jacobson met Schwartz^[18] in Vienna, and informed him of the latest developments, and urged decisions^[19]. Schwartz immediately granted an automatic grant of $20,000 dollars or 1.000.000 Czech korunas to help pay for the Polish Jewish refugee program^[20]. The news was relayed to the Czech cabinet and then released to the press at large. Schwartz also cabled appeals to the board of governors of the Joint in New York and explained the desperate situation. He urged immediate action before the Czechs closed the borders. The Joint headquarters in New York began to pressure the US government and the UNRRA general offices in New York regarding the statements made by Miss Gibbons. In Prague, Deputy Interior Minister Zdenek Toman was keeping the JDC's Gaynor Jacobson fully informed of the behind–the–scenes dealings of the Czech government to allow the transports to continue. But Toman informed Jacobson of a new and very serious complication.

The JDC headquarters in New York responded by publishing the statements made by Miss Gibbons in order to put pressure on whomever they could, from New York Governor Herbert Lehman, to the newly appointed director of the UNRRA Fiorello LaGuardia, former mayor of New York City, all the way up to the U.S. government.

Cable dated July 19, 1946, sent from New York to Schwartz in Paris and a copy to Jacobson in Prague

Toman continued to meet Jacobson and they discussed plans of speeding up the passage of the Jewish refugees through Czechoslovakia. Plans were also established to enlarge the reception facilities for the ever increasing number of refugees. Toman also expressed fear that there might be Ukrainian fascists and other undesirables crossing the Czech borders mixed with the Jewish refugees. Jacobson assured him that the Brichah agents would prevent non–Jews from entering the Jewish transport groups. The possibility of asking Poland to regulate the flow of Jewish refugees was also considered but the idea was dropped. Each country acted in secret and once you start regulations you never know where they end. Toman even promised to return to the Joint a fine of 115.000 ($2300) Czech korunas that was imposed on Jews that crossed the Czech border illegally^[22]. The Joint paid the fine and the Jewish refugees continued their journey. Toman further stated that he had helped and would continue to help the Jewish refugees to cross

Train with Jewish refugees heading west in Czechoslovakia

The Czech Brichah office in Prague headed by Moshe Goberman took the Jewish refugees to the various borders and out of the country. Each train carried about 1,000 Jews. The trains usually stopped at Brno at night where the transients were fed hot meals served by the local Jewish community. The food of course was provided by the Czech Joint^[25]. Practically no convoys of Jews were directed through the city of Prague unless it was unavoidable for fear of alarming Czech officials or media. Toman kept the trains moving and ordered all Czech border guards to let Jews pass the borders with or without papers, and Jacobson and Moshe Govsman (head of the Mossad in Czechoslovakia) kept the convoys of Jews moving across the Czech borders. Thousands of Czechoslovak, Hungarian, Ukrainian, Romanian and Baltic Jews joined the Polish exodus. The UNRRA finally paid the Czech government $225,000 late in the fall of 1946^[26] to cover the old debt that by now reached a million dollars. The Joint also decided to contribute some money to the debt but it was never completely repaid^[27].

Problems occurred with some transports and Toman, Jacobson and the Brichah had their hands full. They worked hand in hand to keep the operation moving in spite of all the obstacles and problems along the way.

The UNRRA assurances that the bills would be paid and the publicized Joint grants to the Czech government had their desired effect. The Czech cabinet voted to continue the refugee program and to keep the borders open^[28]. The cabinet also decided to limit the stay of the transient Jewish Polish refugees to a minimum number of days on Czech soil, to pressure the UNRRA to settle the refugee bills and to increase the allotments for the refugee transient program. Toman expressed his satisfaction with the Joint actions and continued to meet Gaynor Jacobson and even his wife Florence who also worked for the Joint in Prague. She was a trained social worker. In the Brichah movie interview Florence Jacobson stated that she was terrified of Zdenek Toman. She also stated that without Toman there would not have been a mass Jewish exodus from Eastern Europe^[29].

According to Tad Szulc, Toman was very proud of the fact that the borders remained open during the entire debate.^[30] The UNRRA did eventually pay some of the Jewish refugees' expenses for crossing Czechoslovakia. With all the Joint and UNRRA payments, the Czech government still wound up in the red.

Philip Nichols was furious and urged Czechoslovakia to limit Jacobson's activities. The ambassador accused the Joint of bankrolling the transportation of the Jews across the country to Germany and Austria and then to Palestine.^[31] There was some truth in this claim. The Joint not only provided food and medicines to the refugees but also maintained the Brichah organization financially. All Brichah officials were listed as employees of the Joint^[32] and had their offices in the Joint facilities. Czechoslovakia received as many as 20 Brichah emissaries from Palestine according to Michael Hutter, a former Czech Brichah official in Czechoslovakia^[33]. These officials directed the flow of refugees from the Polish borders to the German or Austrian borders. The rapid system of communications at their disposal enabled them to effectively move large masses of people across the country. Trains picked up the transients in the Nachod, Brumov and other camps and transported them to the Austrian and German borders where other guides led them to the D.P. camps.

The Czech leaders Benes, Masaryk and even to a certain extent Gottwald hoped that Russia would permit Czechoslovakia to exist like Finland. To achieve this status, Czechoslovakia needed foreign loans and financial assistance to stimulate the war dislocated economy. The only place where

Memorial erected for a group of “Gordonia” youth Zionists heading to the Czech border. They were attacked and killed by Poles near the city of Nowy Targ, May 1946

Toman of course heard about the Kielce pogrom and other acts of brutality against Jews in Poland but did not expect the refugee deluge that followed it. Toman and Jacobson kept the flood of Jewish refugees moving. The mass exodus consisted primarily of Polish Jews but there were large numbers of Latvian, Estonian, Lithuanian, Hungarian, Slovakian, Romanian, Ukrainian and some Russian Jews. The D.P. camps were bursting with Jewish refugees waiting to leave Europe. Most wanted to go to Palestine but the gates were closed.

Footnotes

1. See Jacobson report from Prague to Paris dated 26 July 1946. Return
2. Ibid Return
3. Yehuda Bauer, Out of the Ashes, pp.107–108 Return
4. Tad Szulc. The Secret Alliance p.158 Return
5. Tad Szulc. The Secret Alliance p.158 Return
6. Most of the Polish Jews who crossed Czechoslovakia had not been repatriated by UNRRA but by the Polish government following the war. Return
7. See letter of Jacobson to JDC office in New York of August 26, 1946 Return
8. Cabinet meeting in Prague October 10, 1946. Return
9. Ibid Return
10. Yehuda Bauer, Brichah, p.204. Random House. New York 1970 Return
11. See letter from Dorothy Greene Return
12. Tad Szulc, The Secret Alliance, p.159 Return
13. Kass–interview Return
14. Kass–interview Return
15. JTA Press Release, January 4, 1946, Washington, USA Return
16. Tad Szulc The Secret Alliance p.159 Return
17. Yehuda Bauer, Out of the Ashes, p.108 Return
18. 18Yehuda Bauer, Out of the Ashes, p.108 Return
19. Cable sent by Jacobson to New York Return
20. Cable sent by Jacobson to New York Return
21. Cable is in the Jacobson report of letter dated July 26^th 1946. Return
22. Ibid. A group of Polish refugees entered Czechoslovakia illegally. They were apprehended by an overzealous guard. The case reached the court house and the judge imposed a fine of 115.000 korunas. The Joint paid the fines and the Jews continued on their journey. The Joint constantly insisted on a refund of the money. The Czech government took its time but eventually refunded the money. Return
23. Martin Smok– movie entitled Brichah. Return
24. Tad Szulc, The Secret Alliance, p.146 Return
25. Yehuda Bauer, Out of the Ashes, p.109 Return
26. Yehuda Bauer, Brichah, p.209. Fiorello La Guardia was soon appointed to head the UNRRA. Return
27. Tad Szulc, The Secret Alliance p.146 Return
28. Tad Szulc The Secret Alliance p.159 Return
29. Martin Smok– movie entitled Brichah Return
30. Tad Szulc, The Secret Alliance p.156 Return
31. Tad Szulc, The Secret Alliance p.155 Return
32. Massuah– A Yearbook of the Holocaust and Heroism, item by Elchanan Gafni–Brichah in Czechoslovakia, pp171–177. Published by Tel Itzhak, April 1997. No.25 Return
33. Martin Smok– movie entitled Brichah Return
34. Toman file published by the office of the investigation of crimes committed under the Communist regime. Czech State documents. Baruch apparently refers to Bernard Baruch, a Jewish financial adviser to US presidents. He certainly was very familiar with the financial situation in the USA. Return
35. See Letter sent by Jacobson to New York October 11^th, 1946 Return

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