Survive and Tell (cont.)

I transferred a great deal of material that I had formally received from the various entities pertaining to the navy, air and ground services, via the Technical Project Officers. The material included reports of experiments, researches, and analyses of development systems, or of impending development of systems. I also passed on similar information to the Americans. The most interesting part of my job in Israel and the USA were the meetings between delegations of both countries.

These meetings were usually generated by a specific requirement of one of the parties, or as a result of correspondence. Prior to the meetings, I would meet the person in charge at the base we were due to visit. I met with hundreds of people in order to set up meetings. Usually, I received preliminary memos to finalize the plan and the itinerary.

From all these memos, I drew up summaries, itineraries, flight schedules, accommodations and transportation, etc.

I met the delegations either in New York or Washington, according to where the meetings were going to take place. During the meetings, I heard many different subjects and, because I did not have to write down the minutes, I was able to watch and listen. I made notes for myself and learnt as I went along. I tried to give a good feeling to all members of the delegations. There were many delegations covering a wide range of spheres that visited during my term of office in Washington. I will describe a few of them, not necessarily the most important of them.

Our Air Force wanted to check various possibilities for upgrading and modernizing the missile and flight test grounds in its Palmachim test grounds.

I organized visits to practically all the test ground facilities in the USA. A delegation headed by Colonel Oded Erez, then Commander of the Palmachim base, a RAFAEL representative, a testing expert from the Ordnance Corps and another Officer from the Air Force. The schedule required one month. We spent at least two days at each base.

The Americans presented us with all the means and experimental systems and an analysis of the results. The trip was very impressive but our staff was rather disappointed because they noted that all the bases used equipment that was between 10 to 30 years old.

We Israelis wished to replace the equipment that was no "older" than 10 years. We saw the seriousness in which the Americans approached each test and experiment and how they maintained their old equipment, even though they could allow themselves more than we could.

In spite of the old (almost obsolete in our eyes) equipment, they executed – and still execute – the most complex and sophisticated tests and experiments. The experience attained by the teams, almost as old as the equipment, over the years, the methodology, proved that this is what achieves, and still achieves, results. I was particularly impressed with their prudence and the love that was showered, by practically all the persons we met, on the equipment they had purchased or developed and which they were renovating or slowly upgrading until the end product was accomplished.

During my meetings at the various labs of the USA Army, I learnt that there were Americans who wished to establish, for various reasons, a database with the "signature" of every type of weapon and system, such as: acoustic, thermal, electronic, seismic, etc. One of the uses was to enable discrete identification to pinpoint the target and guide warheads to destroy these targets. I remembered that in Israel we had tried to find ways to establish a similar database but we did not have the system, tools, computer equipment and sensors to assemble the data.

Therefore, I suggested to my American colleagues that we, in Israel, would offer them the use of the entire arsenal of soviet made equipment, such as tanks, artillery pieces and an additional vast arsenal of captured gear. They would bring their special test and sensors equipment to Israel as well their experience. The costs and expenses would be divided between the two parties. They accepted the offer and it was even accepted in Israel. It was agreed that a delegation would come to Israel to discuss the finer details and plan all of the stages of the experiments so that we, the Israelis, could make all the relevant preparations prior to the Americans arrival in Israel.

The Ministry of Defense appointed RAFAEL to centralize and manage all of the activities in Israel and RAFAEL appointed Uri Rechav head of the team. Uri Rechav was an operational research person, very conscientious and talented, but very sarcastic and his working relationships very often ended in conflict. His behavior, especially his sharp tongue, was cause for concern by the Israelis participating in the discussions. Yossef Ma'ayan, who was then General Manager of the Ministry of Defense, knew Uri well and, therefore, objected to sending him as head of the delegation because he feared that Uri's behavior would disrupt the discussions and hamper the cooperation that had not yet even begun.

RAFAEL insisted that they were entitled to appoint the head of the delegation because they were in charge. Ma'ayan contacted me by phone and told me of RAFAEL's intentions and asked my opinion. I replied that I knew Uri and, since a meeting with him where I had had no choice but to throw him out of my office, we had come to an understanding and I was not worried that his behavior would jeopardize the cooperation between the delegates. I took it upon myself to deal with Uri. Ma'ayan authorized me to send Uri straight back to Israel if he did not behave himself.

The delegation arrived in the USA; we all met in the conference room, where on one side there were 10 people from Israel from all the disciplines and, on the other, a larger number of Americans, representatives of the various corps and professions.

Once I had presented our delegation, Uri Rechav asked to speak and in a very formal voice stated: "I want you to know that Colonel Eitan has the right to dismiss me and send me straight back on the first plane to Israel if I do not behave in a proper fashion" – and then he sat down.

The Americans were stunned. Even though I had known Uri for a long time, he had also managed to surprise me. There was a deafening silence in the room, I got up and told them a few jokes, which, in my opinion, complemented Uri's statement, and I made out that his statement was some kind of Israeli humor.

The discussions were very thorough and pertinent. Uri proved his organizational and technical knowledge. He was a perfect organizer who never forgot or disregarded any detail. RAFAEL's choice of delegate leader was justified.

The issue of the Artillery Location System had begun before the Yom Kippur War. At the MABAT/Israel Aircraft Industries, we had developed an acoustic system for artillery Location called "Fulton". A heated debate arose while defining the specifications with regard to the required accuracy of system. The IDF expert who was supposed to define the accuracy was Colonel Dr. Adam Shefi, a veteran of the Army R&D group who excelled in this sphere of operational research. The IDF had sent him to complete his doctorate studies at Stanford University, California. Adam Shefi demanded that the system locate at a very narrow angle and to achieve this, a large investment had to be made and a very large microphone base had to be implemented, which greatly hampered the "mobility" of the system.

During the Yom Kippur War, Adam Shefi joined, on his own initiative, one of the army divisions, near the Suez Canal, and watched what took place. The enemy's artillery and Katiusha fire was heavy and nobody knew, because of the pace of fire and the number of fallen, how to ascertain whether the shots were being fired from the front, back or from the sides. Adam Shefi managed to call me on the phone and asked for something to locate the fire from an angle of 90 degrees, or even more. He told me that he regretted that he had insisted that the angle be narrow, which had delayed the development process and the completion of the acoustic artillery location system.

After the war, I read in a report that the Americans had opened a tender for developing an artillery locating system. I utilized the DEA (Data Exchange agreement) and asked for details. I received a large amount of material, amongst which, their experimental plan. The Americans had planned to make a mock war zone using explosives to represent guns, mortar, etc. I wanted us to be involved during all the phases of development and that the Americans give their obligation, on the basis of division of means, to let us join them over and above the agreement. I wrote to the TPO, my equivalent in the States according to the agreement, and suggested that instead of using artificial simulation, we could use the real thing, meaning, guns and mortar of all kinds allowed by the Warsaw Pact. I suggested that we supply the equipment and the ammunition.

The Americans were enthusiastic about this idea and we sent them a ship loaded with guns, mortars and the relevant ammunition. We were invited to attend the trials, received detailed reports and were given the feeling that we were partners everywhere we went - even by the competing companies.

At the same time, activities were being held in Israel, headed by Brigadier General Natti Sharoni who was at that time the Chief of the Artillery Corps. Natti, with the assistance of Newteck Eldad (Col. (Res.) Air Force), brought a representative of General Electric to Israel who, together with the artillery representatives, prepared a pamphlet describing modern artillery locating RADAR. They suggested executing this within three years according to a minimum budget. Newteck was appointed representative of G.E. for this project. The head of the G.E. group was an intelligent American Jew, very pleasant and pro-Israel and he spoke as if the RADAR development had already been accomplished. I objected to enter into such an adventure.

G. E. had not developed an artillery location RADAR since 1943. The other companies that had worked on developing the AN/TPQ-36 and the AN/TPQ-37 had already been involved in this project for years and had gained much experience and a mass of data which presented a vital database for developing the algorithm for artillery location.

The head of R&D at that time, Uzi Elam, supported my stand. We detached ourselves from the G.E. issue and continued to put our efforts into following the development of the AN/TPQ-37/36 RADAR.

The Hughes Company won the contest and joined the effort to transform the model that had been used in the trial and to bring it to an engineering level that would later undergo mass production. When I left for the USA and was replaced by Yaacov Ba'al Shem' Tov, they re-established contact with G.E. and even gave them an order for a preliminary research. I was stunned and tried to fight this foolishness from afar. I wrote letters, explained my position - but to no avail.

With Mgen. Arie Levy at GE

My colleagues in the States, especially those that had been responsible for the AN/TPQ-37 RADAR did not approve of our deed, especially in view of their own interest in the issue. We wanted to develop a new RADAR with the financial aid we had received via FMS (Foreign Military Sales) and, accordingly, I was asked to explain why the AN/TPQ-37 was not good enough. If it was not good enough for the war experienced Israelis, why was the US Army using it? A new situation arose that enabled our mutual cooperation.

I began making discrete contacts and gathered the data from Israel, regarding what the Israelis concerned did not like about the American RADAR. I quickly learned that the main reasons had nothing to do with operations but, rather, were based on personal issues, wrapped up in several technical remarks. One officer received the rank of Colonel for the project and he already saw himself traveling to America for a few years with his family. Others had different reasons. For instance, "Elta" was supposed to be the manufacturer in Israel and RAFAEL was supposed to develop the Phased Array Antenna.

Dr. Yossi Shapira, who was responsible for the Electro Magnetic Compatibility at RAFAEL, was depending on this development work, which would have greatly advanced this field.

I do not want to get into theories with regard to all the personal interests involved, but at that time I was convinced they existed. The formal reasons were that the RADAR has a very high profile, the protection too weak and the mobility was not appropriate for a modern mobile battle.

I held many intensive meetings with the Electronic Research and Development Command and they were willing to make every effort to incorporate us in the development works, including modifying the RADAR, with our cooperation, to satisfy our requirements.

They were willing to host the technical operational delegation, to present all the data and discuss cooperation in order to modify the RADAR to our specifications. After a great deal of effort and after overcoming narrow-mindedness, the delegation from Israel arrived, headed by the Chief of the Artillery Corps, B.G. Avraham Bar-David, together with Col. Mickey Naftali, Lieutenant Colonel Shmuel Keren, Dr. Yossi Shapira and another junior officer. We held marathon talks with the administration of the project in Fort Monmouth and afterward at the Hughes Corporation in California. Hughes bent over backwards with their presentation and exposed most of the system. The Company had even prepared, according to the data we had given them, a preliminary plan of their RADAR system inside an armored personnel carrier to increase protection and mobility, and a low profile antenna to minimize vulnerability and detection.

Our delegation had a few more requests in accordance with the requirements of the IDF, including protection against electronic warfare. Dr. Yossi Shapira, who had arrived in order to disqualify the American Army's solution, changed his mind. This happened when the General Manager of Hughes introduced to us the person who was in charge of developing the antenna, Dr. Lee. I learnt that he was the leading man and, perhaps, the inventor of the technology pertaining to the Phased Array Antenna.

The Americans showed us the tools they worked with. They showed us their database. The showed us anything we asked for. The officers that accompanied us made every effort to accommodate us. They were ready to drastically lower the price and even to cover the development costs according to our characterization. The Hughes Company had study classes for academic degrees connected to the South California University. The General Manger of Hughes agreed that our officers, who would be stationed at the Hughes Company during the modification and production stages, would be able to study in these classes as if they were Hughes' employees.

I tried very hard to persuade the delegation, each one separately and all together, that this was a one-time golden opportunity. I remember Dr. Adam Shefi's cry during the Yom Kippur War and I just had to fight for the system. I failed. The failure was even worse because I was convinced that if we did not accept the system and the special conditions they offered us, we would never have an advanced artillery location system. I did not believe for one moment that GE would be able to develop a RADAR according to the schedule they had proposed and, definitely, would not be able to stand by the price they had presented. I knew that a scandal was imminent and that, despite the great efforts I had made with the assistance of the American Army, I could do nothing to prevent it. This falls into the category of Barbara Tuchman's "Parade of Foolishness".

The delegation returned to Israel and recommended to the decision makers to continue to work with GE. The project began but was never completed. I do not know the circumstances, but the IDF did not acquire on time such a vital system for locating enemy artillery weapons. The Katiushas in the north were fired freely and no one could pinpoint where the launcher was located.

In 1987, eight years after the visit to Hughes, the IDF still did not have an artillery locating RADAR. The terrorists bombed our towns from Lebanon and the IDF did not have the appropriate system to locate the source of the fire. No one was held responsible for this fiasco.

The Americans will not sell us the RADAR, according to the model used by the American Army. What they are willing to do is to sell us a version used for export, meaning - minus the protection against electronic warfare and another number of attributes.

Of course, the Americans did not implement the changes that we had recommended and the price is very expensive. It is my opinion that we missed a golden opportunity. This would have helped locate the Katiushas being fired in the north and especially the powerful Syrian artillery during wartime.

I served with Bren for only one year. At the end of the year, we received notice that he was going to be replaced by Shlomo Inbar. I was very sad to hear this. Even during the period when I served at R&D and during my term in Washington, nobody knew about my relationship with Shlomo.

Everyone thought – in fact they were convinced - that we were best friends. In fact, that would have been the case if Shlomo had not changed his attitude and behavior once he became "powerful".

I do not know the reason why Shlomo ceased to be head of R&D after less than a year and a half. My opinion was, and remains, that the Minister of Defense who appointed Shlomo to the position of Head of R&D and the rank of Major General had made a mistake. The mistake was repeated when he appointed him Defense Attaché in Washington. I feel that these appointments caused damage and this opinion is shared with many others.

Just before Shlomo arrived, I received a personal letter from him in which he asked that I find a house for him. He explained that he did not want to live with all the other attaches at the impressive "Irenne" building (located in the prestigious suburb of Bethesda Md, along the northern border of Washington).

I liked his tone - a modest Shlomo was reflected in this letter. I looked for an apartment for him in the area I lived in. I did not like the idea that he had been appointed attaché, but I was not going to be hostile. I wanted to help as much as I could in the hope that our friendship, which was once strong, would perhaps return. Nobody knew about our rift, I kept that to myself. Outwardly, I always portrayed the friendship that I thought he deserved, despite the strange way in which he treated me.

Bren did not want to make any effort on behalf of Shlomo and was quite surprised that I was trying to help him. I traveled to New York and paid myself for the trip because Bren did not feel that it was required to meet him at the airport. Shlomo had in fact visited the States on many occasions, but to arrive with a family, his second wife (the sister of his first wife who had died), and their newborn child, without being met was not very pleasant. It is always nicer to be greeted at an airport. I think that this is the correct behavior and this is what I chose to do. When we arrived in Washington, I gave him a tour of the houses that I had chosen. Lea, Shlomo's wife, did not like any of the houses I had chosen.

She wanted a prestigious entrance with brick walls. Accordingly, I gave instructions to the Real Estate Agents and Shlomo did rent an apartment according to Lea's wishes. The Embassy allocated a large amount for security arrangements but, in view of the necessity to invest even more for the apartment they had chosen, it was decided that they would move into the "Irenne".

Shlomo caused my mood to change. I worked less efficiently. The Embassy had, as I mentioned, an Air Force Attaché, a Naval Attaché, Attaches for the ground forces and Intelligence and R&D Attaché. He did not involve himself with the Air Force, Navy, Ground Forces and Intelligence Attaches because each of them reported back in Israel to a Major General.

He was Head of R&D and he saw himself as an expert in this field. Thus, he was involved in everything concerning the Pentagon, especially the meetings and discussions. Shlomo caused an embarrassing situation when the Americans could not understand why a "general with two stars" (Major General) came to meet with a lieutenant colonel or colonel. Talks were held with people of the same rank and, because of the difference in ranks, there was unnecessary tension. He dealt with issues relevant to a colonel and this did not contribute to promoting issues. Shlomo also lost the sympathy of the other attaches, especially Yallo and Langotski who even held heated discussions with him.

The Naval Attaché was not affected and, therefore, neutral. I tried to find myself other areas of occupation, especially outside of the Pentagon, even though I kept in contact with them according to my sphere of work.

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