Survive and Tell (cont.)

Upon my return to Israel, I had a meeting with the Chief Artillery Officer, Israel Ben-Amitai. I was very grateful that he had prompted my studies at the Technion. Even though the courses in France had been an experience, I did not like the fact that a suitable position had not been found for me according to my capabilities, education, experience and lengthy service. The only position vacant at that time within the antiaircraft array was at the Chief Artillery Command and, left with no other choice, I accepted the position of Head of the AAA Doctrine and Training Branch.

I had already received the rank of Major six years earlier, on the day that I had reported for the Infantry Company Commander's Course. All my colleagues on this course, even those that had taken the course a year later and whom I, myself, had instructed, had been promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. Although I had been granted four years of study at the Technion and courses abroad, I still had the same ambition as any other person to be promoted, both in rank and status, which is natural and understandable. Even if they had given me a choice between rapid promotion and studies, I would have chosen studies, but I still wanted to be promoted.

I knew that the job they had offered me was of no particular importance, but it was only for an intermediate period, until there was a chance to be promoted. Apart from that, it is important that an officer fulfills HQ staff duties, so that he can become acquainted with what goes on on the inside, not only from above, and in order to study the methods and tricks of the H.Q. officers, some of whom are particularly sharp. I shared a room with a young officer, a mathematician, Lieutenant Moshe Rabia. He didn't quite know what they wanted from him. I was responsible, amongst others, for the Antiaircraft Branch at Artillery School number 9.

For a long time, I had been of the opinion that the antiaircraft branch at Training Center number 9 was not situated within the correct organization. Over the years, the entire base and its commanders had been field artillery people, who could not fully appreciate the antiaircraft array and its people. The antiaircraft branch was considered to be inferior to others, even less important than the communications branch. I wanted to transfer the branch to the 883^rd Battalion and to convert the battalion into an antiaircraft school. There were many who objected to this – both in the H.Q. and within the antiaircraft array itself.

Motke Barmor asked me to organize a new course, "Course for Antiaircraft Battery Commanders". I drew up a plan which, in my opinion, was very good, but which was harshly criticized during the summation meeting. I claimed that the plan was fine but the instructors thought otherwise, especially the Course Commander, Uzi Mor. They could not be convinced and, only a few years later, it was proved that I was right.

I wrote the "antiaircraft operations" book that, for several years, many had begun to write but never completed. The book reminded me of the story about the lawyer who, while transferring his inheritance to his son, told him about the file that should never be closed because it had been a source of revenue for his family for many years.

I visited the antiaircraft firing ranges and was shocked at what I saw. Whoever had been responsible for the antiaircraft in the Air Force had decided that the (L 60) 40 mm Bofors guns were not good enough and had purchased 30 mm guns type Hispano Suizza with automatic feeders. The advantages of this gun were that it was very modern, precise and had an especially rapid firing rate. Theoretically, it was possible to shoot without interruption (as long as new trays replaced the emptied ones).

In actual fact, the situation was very different. In order to execute the firing, an ordnance specialist, Regimental Sergeant Major Weitzman – an expert on this gun – stood next to the gun with an oilcan in his hand and oiled the feeder so that the firing would not be interrupted. The guns that Weitzman did not stand next to holding an oilcan shot 2 to 3 bullets and stopped. The bullets got stuck in the loading chamber and were either bent or crushed.

After I had participated in a number of firing drills, I collected some boxes of crushed ammunition and put them on Col. Ben-Amitai's desk. I explained to him that the entire antiaircraft array would not be operational until an appropriate solution was found for this phenomenon. I demanded that he act towards purchasing magazines and appointing an investigative committee to examine how decisions were taken to purchase this gun.

I was puzzled why a gun had been purchased with an automatic feeder that did not operate properly. Had it been tested and checked? Had they sufficed with the presentation or demonstration that the Swiss very well knew how to organize, or had the Swiss sent an obsolete version of the automatic loader to Israel.

I could not understand how the artillery corps had approved the purchase of guns that did not shoot, even in ideal conditions, during a controlled firing range practice. Could it be that they had shown us one model and sent another, that failed?

Following my investigation, it turned out that the problem had been recognized a few years earlier, but nobody had done anything consequential to solve it. In the "Sinai Campaign", or during other raids that the IDF had executed, a number of 30 mm. guns with regular (spiral spring) magazines had been seized. It seemed that there was no problem to shoot the gun with the aid of the magazine, but the weight of the magazine hindered the swift change of an empty magazine with a full one in a short time, during an air raid. At least the guns fired even without Weitzman's assistance and personal pampering.

The 30-mm. gun became famous during operations on the northern border in the battle at the diversion of the water of the Jordan and on other borders. Using the magazine, the 30-mm gun proved to be excellent for the ground use, but the automatic feeder was a disaster.

My dramatic entrance with the box of crushed ammunition to the Chief Artillery Officer's room caused the issue to be dealt with until a solution was found.

There was a debate in the antiaircraft array as to where to situate the 40 mm batteries that had, in the meantime, been introduced to service, but not those that had been thrown out in the 50's. These were 40 mm. Radar and computer aimed L-70 guns that had been purchased in Germany. A delegation of officers from the antiaircraft array, headed by Moshe (Langer) Tamir, was sent for training in Rensburg, Germany. The heavy antiaircraft 883^rd Artillery Battalion was transferred to Arie (Gross) Gur who, later on, established the "Hawk" missile array in the Air Force. The natural candidates to go to Germany were from the 883^rd Battalion and included Uzi (Moreno) Mor, Meir Shariv Tony (Kubelnizki) Eyal, Menachem Gilady, Abrasha Granot, Eli Baruch and, of course, the Battalion Commandant, Moshe Tamir and a few other young men, whose names I cannot remember, joined them.

Motke (Bishbin) Barmor had, in the meantime, been appointed Chief AAA Officer and had asked me to suggest a "scientific" planning methodology for the "AAA protected area". From all that I had learnt in France and England and, mainly, my intuition, I drew up a model and, together with the mathematician Lieutenant Moshe Rabia, created the "bible" that was used by the IDF antiaircraft array for many years to come. It was very often impossible to fully implement our plan in view of area limitations and the number of batteries. Those who did not know that this was just a representative model and a generic method to plan the deployment around an AAA protected area, thought that they were deviating from the plan if they didn't place the batteries exactly as the plan specified.

Amongst the things that we did during this relatively short period at the Artillery Corps HQ was to "scientifically" determine "ammunition keys". I had always been aware of the IDF officers' contempt towards those with academic degrees and the importance they placed on the term "thinking scientifically". I had no idea how to determine ammunition keys and there was no one I could ask.

Therefore, I again decided to build a model and, if the results were acceptable, I would adapt them. Moshe Rabia helped me this time as well to develop the model. I drafted the algorithms and he translated them into mathematical formulas. I asked the Air Force Intelligence for a depiction or scenario of attacks on airports or other vital areas in which the IDF placed AAA defense. I asked the Air Force Operations the ratio of strikes and rate of attrition in air battles.

To my great surprise – I do not understand to this day the role chance played here – the total amount of ammunition necessary according to my model for the 10-day warfare corresponded exactly to the supply in the warehouses. I was surprised and the supply logistics officers were happy.

I am capable of getting used to anything, in spite of the independence I had enjoyed over the years as Battalion Commandant, but I could not get used to sharing a car with another H.Q. officer, especially if this officer was Amikam Reichman. At that time, Amikam lived in Neve Magen and I lived in Kiron. This partnership meant that each one of us had to pick the other up on alternate mornings. This arrangement had many disadvantages. It was only a few years later that they decided to give each officer a car, which not only solved the problem of rides but, chiefly, the friction and quarreling.

When all the "interesting" things had been completed, I went to have a chat with Colonel Israel Ben Amitai, the Chief artillery officer. I opened my heart to him, about my dissatisfaction with the job, my not getting promotion, with the state of the antiaircraft array, the car and many other problems. At the end I added "And I even didn't get to do a parachuting course".

I do not know why I broached this subject, but he caught onto it and asked me: "Would you like to take a parachuting course?" Left with no choice, I answered, "Yes". He dialed a number on the phone and asked: "Menachem, when is the next parachuting course? Tomorrow? Good – register Major Shalom Eitan". With a triumphant look on his face, Israel smiled at me and asked me to report at the Parachuting School the next morning.

I left defeated from a battle I had planned at length. I had not even though of parachuting. 14 years earlier I really had wanted to experience a parachute jump. It was customary then that anyone who respected himself wore the parachute wings, but I was already 36 years old, a father of two daughters, an engineer who had studied in England and France and I did not need this exterior trapping. But one cannot turn back the clock.

I left for the course practically in clandestine. I did not tell my parents and did not publicize my foolishness. I reported at Tel Nof where there were two groups of cadets. One division was for a group of cadets taking the pilots course and the other was a group of young officers. I was the only one over thirty.

The course took place over a period of 18 days. It was very intensive and the most effective that I had ever taken. I parachuted 4 jumps in the day and 1 night jump. The conditions were very primitive, but fatigue and the great way we were treated by the instructors prevailed over the rest. I finished the course without getting hurt. When they pinned the wings on my uniform, I was very proud of myself.

Because of one of the jumps, I could not go to the "Brith Mila" (circumcision ceremony) of Gil, my brother's second son. When I went to visit my parents at the end of the course, my mother shouted at me at how I had dared, a father of two daughters, to jump from a plane at such a height. What would have happened if the parachute hadn't opened? She asked. I really had no answer to that because I am not sure that I would have thought of opening the reserve parachute, in spite of the excellent instruction that I received on the course.

Anti Aircraft Artillery School

I returned to the Artillery Corps HQ and, about a month later, I was informed that it had been decided to appoint me Commander of the 883 ^rd Battalion with the rank of lieutenant colonel. I received the appointment from the Chief of the Air Force, Colonel Moti Hod, on the eve of Rosh HaShana, September 1966. This was the job I really wanted.

The Battalion Commandant I replaced was Lieutenant Colonel Menahem Giladi, who had been in hospital for a long while and, it seemed, would not be able to continue his job for a while.

There were many officers and soldiers who already knew me in the Battalion. Some of them had just heard about me and my attributes. Some were pleased about the appointment while others were fearful of their future. The battalion had regular army batteries, reserve batteries, an additional reserves unit, and a small reserves transition unit. The 883 ^rd Battalion had been having problems in many spheres. The instruction was rather amateur and there had been many road accidents and accidents during training.

I had been informed about the harassment of soldiers and about the recruits who had committed suicide. While I was still at the Artillery Corps, I used to visit the battalion and even took part in drills with the sports instructor, in order to keep fit. I knew that I would most probably receive the job of commanding the 883 ^rd battalion, but I had no idea that it was going to happen so quickly.

During my informal visits, I heard the remarks that were made here and there about what was happening in the battalion, but basically, I could see what was going on and I was not happy at what I saw.

The Deputy Battalion Commandant was Major Amos (Ocsman) Arad. Amos had not worked me with in the past. He had not continued his permanent service directly following his compulsory service, but had returned after a period of reserve duty.

Being that the Battalion Commandant was ill and had been absent from the battalion for a long time, Amos the acting Battalion Commandant, saw himself as his replacement. My arrival was not supposed to make him happy and it was definitely difficult for him to accept me as Battalion Commandant. Even though he had not met me in person beforehand, he knew enough about me to be worried.

At the same time I was appointed Commandant of the 883 ^rd Battalion, and maybe even beforehand, Moshe Tamir was appointed Chief AAA Officer at the IAF HQ. He was already a Lieutenant Colonel and during the period that I served in the Artillery Corps HQ, he was a student at the Staff and Command College.

We were both beginning a new job and, for the first time, he not only had a higher rank than me but, also, a senior position. We had been friends for a long time and I did not see myself as his competitor. I had always felt favored by some of our superiors. Maybe I am wrong about the favoritism, but it was me they sent abroad, I was the first to study for matriculation, I became Battalion Commandant, and I had been sent for academic studies at the Technion.

Promotion had been put on hold in view of my studies at the Technion and in France, which gave me a chance to improve and extend my knowledge and military education. His studies in Germany also gave him an advantage over me and I am convinced that he saw me as competition and, perhaps, as someone who was standing in his way. I have no grounds for my assumption, it's just a gut feeling.

As I mentioned earlier, in 1962 an arms deal with Germany was drawn up, which included an entire antiaircraft array. It was only natural that Moshe, who had replaced me as Commandant of the 883^rd Battalion, head the delegation comprised of some of the officers of the 883^rd Battalion. Upon the delegation's return from Germany, he was a greater authority with regard to the new weaponry and, naturally, the path had been paved for him to command the battalion and, later on, to be appointed Chief AAA Officer.

Receiving the command of the battalion
At my right Lt. Col. Moshe Tamir and Col. Israel Ben-Amitai
At my left Col. Peleg Tamir IAF HQ

I do not remember if I ever thought about competing or about career strategy. Things seemed to sort themselves out somehow, often by chance. They had not organized a job for me even when there had been sufficient time to do so after my studies at the Technion. Therefore, I regarded my career as something of a game of luck or chance. One thing I knew for sure was that every job has to be fulfilled in a responsible and dedicated manner and in the best possible way. There are no second chances. Every job is evaluated separately and each achievement is added to the total accomplishments of a career.

I reached some decisions with regard to the Battalion command, the principle ones were:

• To create operational discipline based on general discipline.
• To prevent training accidents and fatal road accidents.
• To abolish harassment, during boot and basic training during the new recruit's most sensitive army period.
• To encourage constructive criticism from each soldier, beginning on their first day as an army recruits.
• To convert the Battalion into the central school of the antiaircraft array.
• To form a staff of officers and NCOs to assist me in implementing the aforementioned goals and aims.
• To implement all my ideas to create an exemplary unit, in as many aspects as possible.

The task was long and arduous. During the first meeting with the officers, I outlined my idea for the development of the battalion. Some of the officers, not necessarily the best ones, expressed their faith in my plan and promised to do everything to make it a success. Other officers saw this as the empty words of a newcomer and nothing more. The deputy expressed his skepticism to my plan.

At the end of the meeting, in my office, I was surprised when the Deputy asked if he could share the responsibility with me. I told him that I was in charge of everything and that I would do everything and his duty was to do the tasks that I failed to execute or did not have time for. Meaning, that anything I did not do and needed to be done, he would have to carry out immediately and, therefore, he would have to be ready day and night to find tasks that I had either not had the time for, or had not been successful in executing. This was definitely not an easy task and it comes to no surprise that he was not fond of my "distribution" of responsibility.

There is no doubt that I had behaved in an extreme and determined fashion so that he would immediately recognize the fact that I would not suffer another Battalion Commander beside me, or someone who acts as if he were a battalion commander, even within a limited and predetermined area.

The battalion had 2 regular batteries, which were mainly used to assist RAFAEL, Armament Development Authority, in their experiments. The RADAR and the gun were used as a kind of CineTheodolite. A camera or television camera was placed on the barrel of the gun, the RADAR monitored the target and the camera filmed it. The computer supplied the data with regards to the movement, which was synchronized to the pictures. Most of the assistance to RAFAEL was executed near "HaBonim" (in the Atlit region). The batteries were also used to protect the airports during an alert, of which there were many. At one stage, it was decided to have a continuous anti aircraft artillery and missiles defense of the Nuclear Research Center in the south. The responsibility of the task was given to the 883 ^rd Battalion.

I wanted to focus on preparing the Herzlia base to become an antiaircraft school. This demanded transferring the AAA Branch from the Artillery School to 883 and transferring the batteries, regular and reserve to another Battalion, or creating a new battalion to be responsible for the AA defense of the Atomic Research Center in the Negev. Moshe Tamir vehemently supported my proposal and made great efforts to implement it. He appreciated my willingness to relinquish the regular batteries and knew that only a special purpose, fully dedicated Battalion Commander is needed to give the proper attention for the defense of a most sensitive installation with strategic value.

I spent most of my time trying to find solutions for elementary problems concerning discipline, order and organization, but especially to instruct and encourage junior officers who showed great potential. I took them to practice areas and participated as an "instructor" in drills.

As someone who had participated in the Infantry Company Commanders Course, I was an authority, even in the eyes of officers that had instructed and commanded recruit units. My participation in the firing exercises inspired confidence. They had great satisfaction from the fact that this time, in contrast to previous classes, they were able to practice with live ammunition.

In order to reduce the recruit's trepidation and the fears of the parents, I introduced something that, at that time, was revolutionary. When the busloads of recruits arrived from the induction centers, where they had been occupied with what is termed in the army as "Regimental Sergeant Major jobs", I met them on the balcony in front of my office, introduced myself, informed them of where they were and what to expect. I told them they were to inform me of any case of mistreatment, because I completely and utterly forbade this in my battalion. My colleagues warned me that I was undermining discipline and it would not be possible to turn the "spoilt" citizens into soldiers.

Ten days after the training began, I invited the parents to visit the base, to meet their sons and see the equipment, dining room, club, clinic, synagogue, toilets, shower rooms and afterward meet with me, where I explained to them the course of service during the first year. I gave everyone my address at the battalion and home telephone number and invited them to call me any time they felt that their sons were in distress. I asked them not to call me for trivialities. This unusual directness actually paid off. These soldiers were as good as those who had trained in earlier classes, but they felt good about their service and, most importantly, not one of them committed suicide.

I held many meetings with the team of instructors, in the fields, in the tents and tried to persuade them that harassing recruits was destructive, stemming from the bad example they had received when they were recruits. The arguments were stormy and they kept to the opinion that without harassment it was impossible to instill discipline and obedience.

The changeover to a system whereby discipline was implemented without harassment was a slow process but it did develop and, in my opinion, gave good results. At first, the instructors went to the extreme and presented complaints for every minor incident. In due course, the number of complaints dwindled and, in all, they saw that it was possible without harassment.

This system did, indeed, burden the instructor, whose work anyway is very hard, but in the end the new system gave them more satisfaction and was appreciated by the recruits.

As I mentioned, during my 5 years at the battalion, I cannot remember even one suicide or attempted suicide. Not one instructor was accused of harassment, even though there were occasional attempts, but they were discovered in time and the officers involved were either replaced or demoted. I established an instruction office for coordinating training areas, for ordering planes and allocating resources. I appointed officers of courses and branch officers. I reorganized the supply stores, which had to render quick and efficient service to a large number of soldiers, mainly reservists. I introduced summations after each drill, even three-day drills, and I personally spoke with the people that everyone usually complains about, such as the store keeper, the Transportation Officer, the Communications N.C.O., the Regimental Sergeant Major, the Commander of the Clinic and the Ordnance Officer.

I encouraged these people to point out everything that they were dissatisfied with and, instead of giving them the usual answers which I had never liked because they were usually untrue, I made efforts to understand them and did not give up until I had fully understood the problem. I did not allow anyone to avoid the issues concerned. My staff officers did not like me because, via this system, I embarrassed them in front of the soldiers. It was not I who embarrassed them but rather it was their deeds, or rather their mistakes, that caused them humiliation. This system was painful and unpleasant, for me to, but had a correcting effect. The Staff Officers were better prepared before each drill and, during the drill, asked if there were any problems, which had to be solved - even before the summation. Obviously, comments were still made, but the standard improved with each and every class and the ones who enjoyed this most were the Staff Officers themselves. They learned that there is another way and enjoyed my full support when they chose their assistants, training and promotion.

The hardest nut to crack was the Transportation Officer, Regimental Sergeant Major Michaeli, who was the unofficial king of the battalion. He was very professional, knew how to control the drivers, but did not excel in order and discipline. He always had reasons as to why the vehicle did not arrive on time and why they had left without petrol or without a spare tire, etc.

He also tried to "trick" me. This Transportation Officer had many friends amongst the previous commanders, and he gave them special attention, the same as he gave me – the Battalion Commandant's car was perfect and the Battalion Commandant's driver was the best.

I gradually brought him to a halt. I let everyone understand that I was dissatisfied with him and that his days at the battalion were numbered. My "trick" made an impression and there was a significant improvement in vehicles. The number of cars in the garage was drastically reduced and the number of accidents decreased to zero.

During the 5 years of my service in the battalion, there was not one fatal accident or accident in which a soldier was seriously hurt. However, there was one tragic incident during my service: A driver from the transportation corps was assigned for one-day service to the Battalion with his lorry. He was sent to bring a container of water. The driver tried to detach the container from the lorry, without requesting help, and when it became difficult to free the towing hook, lay down underneath the container, which fell on him, crushing him to death. I had not been acquainted with this soldier. I was immediately notified, questioned by the investigating military police who determined that the soldier had not acted according to procedure. I attended his funeral and very much regretted that, because of a momentary lack of attention, this soldier had lost his life and caused his family great pain.

The battalion's base was very neglected. The dwellings and classrooms were intermingled. There was no master plan for the base and every Battalion Commandant randomly authorized the establishment of buildings.

I decided to put an end to this situation. For this purpose, I allocated a special budget. I called in a company of architects to hold a thorough review and to prepare a master plan, which is used to this day at the base. We designated areas for dwellings, for leisure, areas for drills and instruction, maintenance areas and storerooms, etc.

Just before the Six Day War, I deployed the battalion to defend the "Hatserim" base. For this purpose, we called in all reserve units. The period before war broke out was used for practice and to bring the forces into shape. We strictly upheld alert procedures, while training in order to improve the standard, particularly that of the reservists. The "Hatserim" base was one of the newest bases at that time. The Commander of the Base, Colonel Joseph Alon, had brought the base up to the standard of an operational fighter base. The Fuga Squadron, in charge of training the pilots, became a fighter squadron. The Air Force increased the number of pilots in order to operate an extensive fighter force.

The tension in the country was great. The threat of the Egyptian tyrant Nasser, the departure of UN forces and huge dispatches of weaponry from Czechoslovakia instigated apprehension on the home front, which resounded in the base.

I fully participated in the Base Commander's Command Group, I learned about the IDF preparations and, especially, about the Air Force. During the meetings of the Command Group they did not mention operational planning - this they did within the operational framework.

The night before war broke out, we were informed that we needed to be on alert because there were growing signs that the Egyptians were preparing to initiate hostilities. We all had to be ready and prepared. I understood that we were going to react to the threats. I also understood that I could not share this view with anyone else but I had to make sure that the entire defense array under my command was ready and prepared in the case of an air attack on the base.

Since I had always checked, instructed and verified, nobody suspected anything untoward when I did this again. In my heart, I was so alert that I could not sleep. During the morning alert, a standard procedure introduced after the Second World War, I sat in the command post and checked that all the officers were ready and willing.

A few minutes before 8 o'clock, the Air Force planes began to take off towards their targets, which they had studied and knew by heart. We, the antiaircraft array, positioned ourselves beside our equipment, ready and waiting. We knew that, to some extent, the welfare of the base was in our hands.

News of the achievements of our pilots began to trickle in and a few hours later we heard that that the Air Force had successfully performed their mission to destroy most of the enemy planes, while they were still on land, and the ports and infrastructures of the Egyptian Air Force, which, in consequence, had ceased to be operational.

On the second day of the war, I received orders to reduce the forces at "Hatserim" and to set up a battalion to follow the advancing IDF forces. I appointed Aby Har-Even to command the force.

When we heard Mota Gur announcing "Har HaBayit Beyadenu" (The Temple Mount is in our hands) we all burst into tears of joy.

To my delight, the war was over very quickly and the victory was great. About a week after the end of the war, we returned to the bases and began to prepare ourselves for the new situation. We were now a large country, which included the eastern part of the enlarged State of Israel and all of the Sinai.

During the war, a large number of Russian 37 mm. and 57 mm. guns were captured. The Air Force H.Q., not without the encouragement of the antiaircraft array, decided to absorb the equipment and establish many new reserve units accordingly. It did not make sense to me to absorb a mass of old guns that had been thrown in storerooms ten years earlier. The 37-mm. gun was a smaller, practically identical replica of the 40 mm. Bofors gun, which we had removed from the array due to inefficiency. And now, 10 years later, with such remarkable improvements in planes and speed, it seemed illogical to return such an old gun.

The Air Force, it seemed, wanted to appease the General Staff and did not want to allocate funds for purchasing new guns. The establishment of new units was also in the interest of the Chief AAA Officer, who had, in the meantime, changed his title to "The Antiaircraft Defense Officer", in order to command more units and, therefore, perhaps to be promoted to the rank of Colonel. His aim was clear and logical, but the way to achieve it was questionable.

As previously explained, in February 1967, when nobody knew or even guessed about the impending Six Day War, I gave up, on my own accord and to everyone's astonishment, two regular batteries and then an additional regular battalion was established in order to defend the Nuclear Research Center.

My friend, Abrasha Granot was appointed Commandant of the 955 ^th Battalion. We gave the soldiers a farewell party at the Nuclear Research Center, during which a young new immigrant soldier sung for them – his name was Avi Toledano.

I continued to make efforts to improve instruction. Moshe Tamir initiated the establishment of a Doctrine Committee, which I headed. This committee met at the Antiaircraft School (this was the new name we had introduced) after working hours and, there, we found solutions for problems or disputes.

I "extended" the boundaries of the base and, in fact, placed fences in their proper place according to the land chart. When I had decided to enlarge the kitchen used by the officers and the sergeants, it became apparent that there was room for this on the chart but in practice, there was not. The surveyors found that the fence had withdrawn 10 meters into the camp area. When we began to clear the hill on the other side of the fence, we found remnants of tents, guns and Sten guns.

I asked the veterans of the battalion how this had happened and they told me that every time there was an accumulation of rubbish next to the fence, instead of removing the garbage, they moved the fence. We removed over 70 truckloads of garbage that had accumulated over the years.

We moved the gate further inside and prepared a parking lot for guests at the entrance to the camp. We built an Officers Club and a Non-Commissioned-Officers Club.

We built a synagogue, moved the Regimental Sergeant Major's office and the barber nearer the new gate, next to the regimental policeman, and built a humane detention cell with a shower and toilet.

The base was transformed - cleanliness and order was apparent in every corner of the camp. It was clear that it was being looked after.

The Herzlia Municipality, who had "adopted" us, helped us in many ways. They enlarged the parade grounds to accommodate the new requirements. I held the IDF Military Sports Competition and, in return, received a new obstacle course. We built an auditorium, which was very beautiful in comparison to the other buildings at the base at that time. We prepared a football pitch. The entire battalion was chuffed. We created a very beautiful colored emblem for the school and each soldier wore it proudly on his lapel.

The years passed, the workload was great. My relationship with Moshe was "correct". Every now and then there was a disagreement but, all in all, I refer to our relationship as a satisfactory one. I had no complaints about him and, I think, he was satisfied with my work. It is true that it was difficult for his staff to work with me, but I am sure they had no complaints about the operations of the Antiaircraft School, which efficiently accomplished all of its task.

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